Zu Zeiten als die Politikwissenschaft noch darüber diskutiert hat, welche Form von Wahlsystem die beste oder besser ausgedrückt, diejenige ist, von der die geringste Gefahr ausgeht, dass politische Korruption, politischer Favoritismus oder politischer Stimmenkauf und damit rent seeking erfolgt, haben Wissenschaftler eine Reihe von Methoden entwickelt, um zu verhindern, dass Abgeordnete zu Lobbyisten in eigener Sache werden und Regierungsparteien sich Wiederwahl durch Wahlgeschenke kaufen.
Eine dieser Methoden wurde von James Buchanan und Gordon Tullock im Calculus of Consent entwickelt. Tullock beschreibt sie in seinem Beitrag “Exchange and Contracts”:
“There is, however, an interesting variant. Countries that once formed part of the British Empire normally elect legislatures by what is know as the ‘first past the post’ method. The candidate with most votes wins regardless of how slim the majority vote. Lincoln, for example, faced three opponents and won with thirty-five percent of the popular vote. A legislature made up by this kind of voting may have a majority with less than fifty percent of the popular vote. The British House of Commons, for example, for many years has had a single-party majority although the winning party normally has only forty-five percent or less of the popular vote.
Most democracies that have not descended from the British Empire, however, use what is know as proportional representation. To explain proportional representation it is easier to use the Israeli method that represents a very simple example. All parties present lists of candidates. The voter then checks the list he likes most. The seats in the legislature are divided among the parties in strict accord with the number of popular votes. Thus a very small minority will have representatives although they will be a small minority of the legislature.
If, however, we have one house of the legislature elected by proportional representation and the other by the English method, then a majority in each house would represent different voters. Thus for a bill to get through both houses it would need to represent a majority of voters in each of these classifications. The net effect would be that for any bill to pass, representatives of more than a majority of the population would need to be in favor. It would have much the same effect in reducing the size of the exploited minority as requiring a higher majority in a single house”
(Tullock, Rent Seeking Society, pp.290-291)